International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics
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Volume 3, No. 12, December 2016 Pages: 758 - 763
Endogenous Timing in a Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor
This paper considers mixed duopoly games where a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete in price. The public firm aims to maximize the un-weighted sum of consumer surplus and its own profit. The paper examines a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm, an effect of eliminating the foreign firm and an endogenous role in price-setting mixed duopoly by adopting the observable delay game. Consequently, the paper shows that the unique equilibrium of price-setting international mixed competition is quite different from that of quantity-setting international mixed competition.
Price competition, endogenous timing, mixed market, foreign private firm.
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